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United States Supreme Court has held
law is preempted by section 301 of the
of
state
that an application
Labor Management Relations Act only if such application requires
interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement.
ACT-PREEMPTION-The

Lingle v. Norge Division, Magic Chef, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1877 (1988).
Jonna Lingle was employed by the Norge Division of Magic Chef
at Norge's manufacturing plant in Herrin, Illinois.1 On December
5, 1984, Lingle notified her employer that she had been injured in
the course of her employment.2 Lingle requested compensation for
her medical expenses pursuant to the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act.3 On December 11, 1984, Norge discharged Lingle for filing a "false" workers' compensation claim."
The union representing Lingle promptly filed a grievance in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement covering all production and maintenance employees in the Herrin plant.5 In the
grievance, the union asserted that Lingle's workers' compensation
claim had not been false. The agreement protected employees
from discharge except in cases where the employer could show
"just" cause.7 The agreement also established a procedure for the
arbitration of grievances.'
On July 9, 1985, prior to her grievance reaching arbitration, Lin-

gle filed a complaint in the Illinois district court.9 The complaint
alleged that she had been discharged for exercising her rights
under the Illinois Workers' Compensation Laws.1" Norge removed
1. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1877 (1988).
2. Id. at 1879.
3. Id. Illinois Workers' Compensation Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.1 et seq.
(1983).
4. 108 S. Ct. at 1879.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. Article 26.2 of Lingle's Collective Bargaining Agreement provided in part:
"[Tihe right of the employer to discharge or suspend an employee for just cause is recognized." Id. appendix at 13.
8. 108 S. Ct. at 1879. Article 8.5 of Lingle's collective bargaining agreement provided
for mandatory arbitration and grievance procedures that were to be the exclusive remedy
for all disputes. Id. appendix at 10.
9. 108 S. Ct. at 1879.
10. Id. Lingle's cause of action was not based on a statutory provision of the Illinois
Workers' Compensation Act. Id. at 1881. Lingle's cause of action was judicially created. See
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the case to federal district court on the basis of diversity of citizenship, 1 and then filed a motion to either dismiss the case on preemption grounds 2 3or stay the proceedings pending the completion
of the arbitration.1
The federal district court dismissed the complaint, 4 holding
that the case was preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) as construed by the United States
Supreme Court in Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck.15 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court, 6 holding
that Lingle's state claim was preempted by section 301 because a
state court determination of wrongful discharge implicated the
same analysis of facts as would an inquiry under the just cause
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. 7
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari'" to resolve
the conflict at the circuit court level on the issue of section 301
preemption of state law based claims. 19 In an opinion written by
Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978) (recognizing the tort of retaliatory discharge for filing a workers' compensation claim). This tort action was expanded by
the Illinois Supreme Court to allow employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement
containing a binding arbitration clause to bring such an action. See Midgett v. SackettChicago, Inc., 105 Ill. 2d 143, 473 N.E.2d 1280 (1984).
11. 108 S. Ct. at 1879. The issue of whether the case was properly removed to federal
court was discussed fully by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The court concluded that
removal was proper and that, therefore, the court had jurisdiction. Lingle v. Norge Div. of
Magic Chef, Inc., 823 F.2d 1031, 1037-1042 (7th Cir. 1987).
12. 108 S. Ct. at 1879. Norge relied on Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
See infra notes 98-108 and accompanying text.
13. 108 S. Ct. at 1879. The arbitrator ultimately reinstated Lingle with full back pay,
finding that her employer had not met the burden of showing just cause for her discharge.
Lingle, 823 F.2d at 1034.
14. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 1448 (S.D. Ill. 1985).
15. Id. at 1449. See supra note 12. Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations
Act of 1947 provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in
controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982 & Supp. 1 1983).
The federal district court reasoned that Lingle's claim for retaliatory discharge was "inextricably intertwined" with the collective bargaining provision prohibiting discharge without
just cause. Lingle, 618 F. Supp. at 1449. The court also found that Lingle's claim should be
dismissed for failure to exhaust grievance and arbitration procedures. Id. at 1450 (citing
Republic Steel v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965)).
16. Lingle, 823 F.2d at 1046.
17. Id.
18. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 226 (1987).
19. The Second, Third and Tenth Circuits had allowed state law based retaliatory
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Justice Stevens expressing the unanimous view of the Court, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision was reversed. The Supreme Court held that an application of state law is preempted by
section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act only if such
application requires interpretation of the collective bargaining
agreement.2 ° The Supreme Court further explained that:
[E]ven if dispute resolution pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement,
on the one hand, and state law, on the other, would require addressing...
the same set of facts, as long as the state law claim could be resolved without interpreting the [collective bargaining] agreement itself, the claim is
"independent" of the agreement for section 301 pre-emption purposes.2

The Supreme Court began its analysis by examining previous
Supreme Court cases in which section 301 was at issue to determine whether and to what extent state law based claims should be
preempted by federal law. Relying on Textile Workers Union v.
Lincoln Mills,2 2 the Court established that section 301 provides
federal courts with jurisdiction over collective bargaining agreements and authorizes these courts to fashion a body of federal law
for the enforcement of the collective bargaining agreements. 23 Justice Stevens noted that the preemptory effect of section 301 was
announced in Teamsters v. Lucas Flour,4 which held that section
301 mandates resort to federal rules of law in order to ensure uniform interpretation of collective bargaining agreements.2 5 In Lucas
Flour, the Court preempted the application of state law in a
discharge claims for filing workers' compensation claims to proceed, disregarding § 301 preemption. See Baldracchi v. Pratt & Whitney Aircraft Div., United Technologies Corp., 814
F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2819 (1988); Herring v. Prince Macaroni of
N.J., Inc., 799 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1986); Peabody Galion v. A.V. Dollar, 666 F.2d 1309 (10th
Cir. 1981). The Seventh Circuit in Lingle and the Eighth Circuit found state law based
retaliatory discharge claims for filing workers' compensation claims to be preempted by §
301. See Johnson v. Hussman Corp., 805 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1986). The Ninth Circuit, although not addressing retaliatory discharge actions for filing workers' compensation claims,
had addressed these actions in other contexts with varying results. See Garibaldi v. Lucky
Food Stores, Inc., 726 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1984) (no § 301 preemption for "whistle blower"
wrongful discharge action), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1099 (1985); Paige v. Henry J. Kaiser Co.,
826 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1987) (no preemption for retaliatory discharge claim for complaining
to employer about unsafe working conditions), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2819 (1988). But see
Bale v. General Tel. Co. of California, 795 F.2d 775 (9th Cir. 1986) and Desoto v. Yellow
Freight Systems, Inc., 811 F.2d 1333 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. granted and judgment vacated,
108 S. Ct. 2813 (1988).
20. 108 S.Ct. at 1885.
21. Id. at 1883.
22. 353 U.S. 448 (1957). See infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
23. 108 S.Ct. at 1880.
24. 369 U.S. 95 (1962). See infra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
25. 369 U.S. at 104.
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straightforward contract interpretation issue: whether the collective bargaining agreement implicitly prohibited a strike that had
been caused by the union.2"
Justice Stevens next examined Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck,27 in
which the Court held that section 301 preempted the application
of a Wisconsin remedy for bad-faith handling of an insurance
claim. 28 The Lueck court noted that the collective bargaining
agreement provided the basis for the manner in which benefit
claims would be handled, and concluded that, because an analysis
of the collective bargaining agreement was necessary, federal law
should apply. 29 Justice Stevens opined that Lueck had faithfully
applied the section 301 preemption announced in Lucas Flour. 0
Based on this case law analysis, the Supreme Court concluded that
if resolution of a state law claim depends upon the meaning of a
collective bargaining agreement, the application of state law (possibly leading to inconsistent results) should be preempted and uniform federal labor law principles should apply."1
Justice Stevens next applied this conclusion of law to the facts
presented in order to determine whether Lingle's state law claim
should be preempted by section 301. In beginning this analysis, the
Supreme Court found that the Illinois courts have recognized the
tort of retaliatory discharge for filing a workers' compensation
claim, 2 and have held that this tort applies to employees covered
by union contracts. 3 The Court further found that in order to
show this type of retaliatory discharge in Illinois, a plaintiff must
set forth facts from which it can be inferred that: (1) he was discharged or threatened with such; and (2) the employer's motive in
discharging or threatening to discharge was to deter the employee's
exercise of rights under the Workers' Compensation Act or to interfere with the exercise of these rights.3" Justice Stevens added
26. Id. at 98.
27. 471 U.S. 202 (1985). See supra notes 98-108 and accompanying text.
28. 471 U.S. at 212.
29. Id. at 218.
30. 108 S. Ct. at 1881. See infra notes 67-73 and accompanying text for a more detailed explanation of the § 301 preemption doctrine announced in Lucas Flour.
31. Id.
32. Id. See supra note 10.
33. Id.
34. Id. (citing Horton v. Miller Chemical Co., 776 F.2d 1351, 1356 (7th Cir. 1985)
(summarizing Illinois state court decisions), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1122 (1986)); see also
Gonzalez v. Prestress Engineering Corp., 115 Ill. 2d 1503, 503 N.E.2d 308 (1986) (listing
elements for retaliatory discharge cause of action under Illinois workers' compensation
laws).
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that an employer, in order to defend against such an employee
claim, must show that it had a non-retaliatory reason for the discharge. 35 The Supreme Court reasoned that elements which are required to be set forth by the employee and the elements of a
proper defense present purely factual questions pertaining to the
conduct of the employee and the conduct and motivation of the
employer. 36 The Court said that none of the aforementioned elements requires a court to interpret any term of a collective bargaining agreement.3 7 Since resolution of the state law claim in this
case did not require construing the collective bargaining agreement, Justice Stevens concluded that Lingle's state law remedy
was "independent" of the collective bargaining agreement such
that it was not preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. 8
In support of this conclusion, the Supreme Court examined how
a state law claim may be considered "independent" of a collective
bargaining agreement even though the state claim may require the
same analysis of facts as a grievance under the provisions of the
labor agreement. Justice Stevens agreed with the Seventh Circuit's
explanation that a state court in considering Lingle's claim might
implicate the same analysis of facts as would a contractual determination of whether Lingle was fired for just cause. 9 However, the
Supreme Court disagreed with the circuit court's conclusion that
such parallelism renders the state law analysis dependent upon the
contractual analysis.40 The Court reasoned that, although there are
instances where the National Labor Relations Act preempts state
law on the basis of the subject matter of the law in question,4 1 section 301 preemption merely ensures that federal law will be the
basis for interpreting collective bargaining agreements.4 2 Justice
Stevens further noted that section 301 says nothing of the substantive rights a state may provide to workers when adjudication of
those rights does not depend upon interpretation of a collective
bargaining agreement."3 The Supreme Court concluded, therefore,
35.
Comm'n,
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

108 S. Ct. at 1882 (citing Loyola Univ. of Chicago v. Illinois Human Rights
149 Ill. App. 3d 8, 500 N.E.2d 639 (1986)).
108 S. Ct. at 1882.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1883.
Id.
Id. See infra note 61.
108 S. Ct. at 1883.
Id.
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that as long as a state law claim can be resolved without interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement, the claim is "independent" of the agreement for section 301 preemption purposes."
In further support of its holding, the Supreme Court asserted
that the resolution reached was consistent with the policy of fostering uniform, certain adjudication of disputes over the meaning
of collective bargaining agreements. 5 Justice Stevens restated that
one of the central underlying reasons for the Court's holding in
Lucas Flour was to preserve the effectiveness of arbitration.4 6 Furthermore, the Court reiterated previously announced policy considerations stating that any rule that permitted an individual to sidestep available grievance procedure would cause arbitration to lose
much of its effectiveness, as well as eviscerate a central tenet of
federal labor law under section 301; that is, the arbitrator, not the
court, has the responsibility to interpret the labor contract in the
first instance."7 The Supreme Court concluded that its holding permits the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements to remain firmly in the arbitral realm,4" and that judges can determine
questions of state law involving labor management relations only if
such questions do not require interpreting collective bargaining
agreements."9
In final support of its holding, the Supreme Court stated that its
holding was consistent with previous Supreme Court cases which
have permitted separate fonts of substantive rights to remain unpreempted by federal labor law statutes.5 0 Justice Stevens noted
that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has shown its cognizance of this fact in its recognition that section 301 does not preempt state anti-discrimination laws." This recognition, the Court
said, was made even though a suit under these laws, like a suit
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1884.
46. Id.
47. Id. (citing Paperworkers v. Misco, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 364 (1987) and Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960)).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. See infra notes 82-90 and accompanying text.
51. 108 S. Ct. at 1885. The circuit court in deciding Lingle recognized that § 301 does
not preempt state anti-discrimination laws even though a suit under those laws, like a suit
alleging retaliatory discharge, requires a state court to determine whether just cause exists
to justify the discharge. Lingle, 823 F.2d at 1046. The circuit court distingushed these cases
by stating that Congress has expressly stated that state anti-discrimination remedies may
exist within the framework of federal statues that authorize multiple independent decisions.
Id. at 1047 n.17.
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alleging retaliatory discharge, requires a state court to determine
whether just cause existed to justify the action. 2 The Supreme
Court opined that this independent operation of state anti-discrimination laws was illustrative of how the mere fact that a broad
contractual protection against discrimination may provide a remedy for conduct that coincidentally violates state law does not
make the existence of the state law violation dependent upon the
terms of the private contract." The Supreme Court reasoned that
even if an arbitrator should conclude that the contract does not
prohibit a particular discriminatory act, this conclusion might or
might not be consistent with a proper interpretation of state law."'
Hence, the Court concluded that in a typical case, a state tribunal
could resolve a discrimination claim without interpreting
the "just
55
cause" language of a collective bargaining agreement.
The Supremacy Clause56 of the United States Constitution
grants Congress the power to preempt state law. 7 Whether a state
action is preempted by federal law is a question of congressional
intent.5 In 1947, Congress expressed its intent to regulate private
sector labor-management relations by enacting the Labor Management Relations Act and the National Labor Relations Act. 59 Congress, however, did not explicitly provide the extent to which state
law was to be preempted by these Acts. 0 As a result, the Supreme
52. 108 S. Ct. at 1885.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. U.S. CONST. art. VI § 32, cl.2.
57. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (New York state law awarding
exclusive franchise for ferry traffic between New York City and Elizabethtown, New Jersey,
preempted by Congressional power to regulate interstate commerce).
58. Id. at 10, stating that "where state laws interfere with, or are contrary to, the laws
of Congress, . . . the act of Congress . . . is supreme, and the law of the state, though
enacted in the exercise of power not controverted, must yield to it." Id.
59. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1982 & Supp. I 1983).
60. See Cox, Recent Developments in Federal Labor Law Preemption, 41 OHIo ST.
L.J. 277 (1980). Archibald Cox has been the leading commentator on the subject of federal
preemption in the labor law area. For additional general information concerning labor law
preemption, see Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1337 (1972) [hereinafter Cox, Labor Law Preemption]; Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67
HARV. L. REV. 1297 (1954). The body of literature on the subject of federal labor law preemption is much too vast to cite comprehensively in this casenote. However, among the
significant articles on the subject are the following: Smith, The Taft-Hartley Act and State
Jurisdictionover Labor Relations, 46 MIcH. L. REV. 593 (1948); Hays, Federalismand Labor Relations in the United States, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 959 (1954); Hays, State Courts and
FederalPreemption, 23 Mo. L. REV. 373 (1958); Wellington, Labor and the Federal System,
26 U. CHI. L. REV. 542 (1959); Michelman, State Power to Govern Concerted Employee
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Court in a series of cases has attempted to establish the scope of
federal labor law preemption. 1
Section 301 of the LMRA has been a source of law which has
provided both a doctrine of federal preemption and procedural
safeguards to insure the carrying out of congressional intent. The
Supreme Court interpreted section 301 in Textile Workers Union
v. Lincoln Mills.2 In Lincoln Mills, the Court decided that section
301 conferred more than federal jurisdiction over labor organizations. The Court determined that Congress, in section 301, expressed a federal policy that federal courts should enforce collective bargaining agreements and that industrial peace could be best
obtained only in that way. 3 To effectuate this congressional intent,
the Supreme Court concluded that federal substantive law fashioned from the policy of our national labor laws should be applied
Activities, 74 HARV. L. REv. 641 (1961); Sovern, Section 301 and the Primary Jurisdictionof
the NLRB, 76 HARV. L. REV. 529 (1963); Come, Federal Preemption of Labor-Management
Relations: Current Problems with the Application of Garmon, 56 VA. L. REV. 1435 (1970);
Lesnick, Preemption Reconsidered: The Apparent Reaffirmation of Garmon, 72 COLUM. L.
REV.

469 (1972).

61. The Supreme Court's attempt to determine the scope of preemption under the
LMRA has produced over three dozen decisions since 1947. These decisions can be divided
into two distinct categories of preemption. See Cox, Labor Law Preemption, supra note 60,
at 1339. The first category has been labeled "subject-matter" preemption and is most closely
associated with the case of San Diego Building Trades Assoc. v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236
(1959). In Garmon, the Supreme Court held that both the state and federal judiciaries must
defer in the first instance to the expertise of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) in
the regulation of conduct arguably protected or prohibited by § 7 or § 8 of the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Id. at 245. This "Garmon Rule" acted to protect the primary
jurisdiction of the NLRB. See also Street, Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v.
Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971); Operating Engineers Local 926 v. Jones, 460 U.S. 669 (1983);
Wisconsin Dept. of Industry, Labor & Human Relations v. Gould, 475 U.S. 282 (1986).
The second category of preemption cases is based upon the necessary federal protection of
a uniform body of federal labor law. See Cox, Labor Law Preemption, supra note 60, at
1339. This category is associated with the case of International Ass'n of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976), and
preempts state action in areas that are neither arguably protected nor prohibited by § 7 or §
8 of the NLRA. In Machinists, the Supreme Court determined that, although the conduct
in question is neither arguably protected nor prohibited by the Act, Congress intended that
the conduct be left unregulated by the states. Id. at 139. See also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985). This casenote focuses on the narrow doctrine of preemption under § 301 of the LMRA. Generally, § 301 preemption affects claims or rights
which are substantially dependent upon or derived from the terms of a collective bargaining
argeement.
62. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
63. Id. at 455. Subsequent Supreme Court cases expanded the impact of the Lincoln
Mills decision to give concurrent jurisdiction to the state courts and requiring the state
courts to apply federal law in deciding suits based on breaches of collective bargaining
agreements. See Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
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in section 301 suits.64 In fashioning this new body of federal law,
courts were to resort to state law only if it was compatible with the
purposes of section 301.68 Any state law applied would be absorbed
as federal law and would not be an independent source of private
rights. 6
The preemptive effect of section 301 was announced by the Supreme Court in Teamsters v. Lucas Flour.6 7 In Lucas Flour, the
Court faced a situation where an employer sued its employees'
union in a state court for damages for business losses caused by a
strike." The issue in state court was whether the strike was implicitly prohibited by the parties' collective bargaining agreement.6 9
The state supreme court determined the issue using state law.7"
The Supreme Court held that incompatible doctrines of state law
must give way to principles of federal law,7 1 reasoning that individual contract terms might have different meanings under state and
federal law which would in turn exert a disruptive influence upon
both the negotiation and administration of collective bargaining
agreements. 7' The Court noted that once the collective bargain was
made, the possibility of conflicting substantive interpretation
under competing legal systems would tend to stimulate and prolong disputes as to its interpretation and might substantially impede the parties' willingness to agree to contract terms providing
final arbitral or judicial resolution of disputes.7"
Section 301 has also given rise to procedural prerequisites to
bringing suit.7" The most significant is the exhaustion of contractual remedies as established in Republic Steel Corporation v.
Maddox.7 5 In Maddox, an employee brought suit in state court for
breach of contract, alleging that he was owed severance pay under
the terms of a collective bargaining agreement between Republic
64. 353 U.S. at 456.
65. Id. at 457.
66. Id.
67. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
68. Id. at 96.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 103.
71. Id. at 107.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151
(1983) (six month statute of limitation between breach of collective bargaining agreement
and institution of § 301 suit).
75. 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
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Steel and his union.7 6 That agreement contained a three-step
grievance procedure culminating in binding arbitration. 7 The Supreme Court in Maddox promulgated the general rule that employees with grievances must attempt to use the contractual grievance procedure unless the collective bargaining agreement
otherwise provides.78 Three justifications were given for this rule.
First, by requiring the individual employee to have his claim
processed by the union, a court enhances the union's position as
the exclusive bargaining agent.79 Second, the employee reduces the
choices of remedies against him in contract disputes.80 Third, to
the extent that the grievance procedure is established as an exclusive remedy, private dispute resolution becomes attractive and the
purpose of the Taft-Hartley Act to promote collective bargaining is
carried forward.8 '
Maddox, Lucas Flour and Lincoln Mills established that federal
law is paramount in the area covered by section 301 and that the
grievance and arbitration procedures contained in collective bargaining agreements are the preferred forum for resolving matters
involving the breach of collective bargaining agreements. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Company,82 the Supreme Court ad-

dressed a situation where an employee covered by a collective bargaining agreement containing grievance and arbitration procedures
asserted a federal claim against his employer. In Alexander, a
black union employee grieved his dismissal, claiming that he was
discharged without just cause and in violation of a non-discrimina76. Id. at 650-51.
77. Id. at 651.
78. Id. at 652-53. The contract between Maddox's union and Republic Steel did not
specify an available remedy other than the grievance procedure for breaches of the collective
bargaining agreement. Id. at 653. Once Maddox received a result from the grievance procedure, whether it was an arbitration award or a decision by the union not to proceed further
with the grievance, any subsequent § 301 suit would have to be dismissed. Id. at 657.
The Supreme Court has carved out exceptions to the Maddox procedural requirements.
See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) (employee entitled to sue his employer without exhausting contractual remedies if employee can prove that the union has breached its duty of
fair representation in handling the employees grievance); see also Hines v. Anchor Motor
Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976) (employee able to sue his employer and his union after his
wrongful discharge claim has been decided under a final, binding arbitration provision
where union has breached its duty of fair representation and discharge violates the collective bargaining agreement).
79. 379 U.S. at 656.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 653.
82. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).

1989

Recent Decisions

823

tion clause in his collective bargaining agreement. 83 The employee
pursued his grievance through arbitration and lost.84 Subsequently,
he filed a Title VII discrimination suit.8 5
Although both the district court and the Tenth Circuit held that
the arbitration procedure precluded the employee from bringing a
Title VII suit, the Supreme Court reversed.86 The Court stated
that neither an adverse arbitral decision nor failure to exhaust the
remedies available in the collective bargaining agreement foreclosed a Title VII action. 7 The Court reasoned that Title VII was
intended to supplement, not supplant, existing discrimination laws
and that Title VII afforded non-waivable private rights. 8 In addition, the Court added that Title VII rights and collective bargaining rights have independent origins and that while arbitration affords vindication of an employee's contractual rights, Title VII
provides rights afforded by Congress.8 9 The Supreme Court concluded that the distinctly separate nature of these rights is not vitiated merely because both are violated as a result of the same factual occurrence.90
91
In Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Massachusetts,
the Supreme Court determined the preemptive force of federal labor law over a state statute affecting the substantive terms of collective bargaining agreements. In Metropolitan Life, Massachusetts passed a statute which required that group health insurance
plans contain minimum mental health coverage for all employees,
union as well as non-union.2 The Massachusetts Attorney General
sued insurance carriers to enforce the statute. The insurers argued
that the statute interfered with the substance of collective bargain83. Id. at 42.
84. Id.
85. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982).
86. 415 U.S. at 52. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 466 F.2d 1209 (10th Cir.
1972) and Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 346 F. Supp. 1012 (D. Colo. 1971).
87. 415 U.S. at 52.
88. Id. at 51.
89. Id. The reasoning in Alexander was extended by the Supreme Court to cover other
federal suits brought by organized employees. See Barrantine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201219 (1985)); McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984) (suit under the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982)); Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. v. Buell,
107 S. Ct. 1410 (1987) (suit under the Federal Employees Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60
(1982)).
90. 415 U.S. at 49-50.
91. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
92. Id. at 727.
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ing agreements, thereby conflicting with federal labor law.9 3 The
Supreme Court held that the Massachusetts statute did not impede federal labor law policy and was therefore not preempted."'
The Metropolitan Life Court noted that although the statute
did alter the substantive terms of agreements, such a statute was
not forbidden by federal labor law.9 5 The Court reasoned that
should unions and employers be allowed to strike an agreement
that conflicts with a mandatory state benefit law, this would subvert the very premise of the NLRA.98 The Court said that such a
rule would penalize workers who have chosen to join a union by
preventing them from benefiting from state labor regulations imposing minimal standards on non-union employees. 7
The Supreme Court has also addressed the issue of section 301
preemption as applied to organized employees' state-law based
claims. In Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck,98 a unionized employee
brought a state action for bad faith handling of an insurance claim
against his employer. The employee, Lueck, alleged that his employer intentionally failed to pay disability benefits to which he
was entitled under the terms of the disability plan established by
his union's collective bargaining agreement with Allis-Chalmers. 9
Lueck did not attempt to invoke the contract's grievance procedure, but instead brought his suit in state court.1 0 If Lueck's bad
faith claim were characterized as breach of contract, then section
301 would govern and the grievance procedures would have to be
exhausted before suit could be maintained. 10 1 If his claim were
characterized as exclusively a tort claim arising only out of breach
of statutory duties by the insurance administrator, section 301
would not apply and the state court action could proceed.
The Leuck Court held that resolution of the state law claim was
dependent upon interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement,102 reasoning that the breadth of the grievance clause at issue 03 hardly suggested that only the right to receive benefits, and
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 734.
Id. at 758.
Id. at 748.
Id. at 756.
Id.
471 U.S. 202 (1985).
Id. at 206.

Id.
Id. at 207.
Id. at 214-15.
Id. at 215. With reference to the disability plan, a Joint Plant Insurance Commit-
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not the manner in which they were received, was covered by the
grievance procedure.' 0 ' The Court noted that the collective bargaining agreement did indeed posit two separate duties: the implied duty to act in good faith and the explicit contractual duty to
pay.'0 5 The extent and interpretation of those duties, however,
were plainly questions preempted by section 301.106 The Supreme
Court further stated that Lueck's failure to exhaust his contractual
grievance should have led to dismissal of the state claim under a
Maddox and Lucas Flour analysis.'0 7 According to the Lueck
Court, the need for both an effective arbitration system and avoidance of conflicting state interpretations of contract terms plainly
preempted Lueck's tort claim. Lueck fell under the alternative dismissals of preemption by section 301 and failure to exhaust grievance procedures under Maddox.'0°
In Caterpillar,Inc. v. Williams,'0 9 the Supreme Court addressed
the issue of whether section 301 preempts state contract claims.
The claims in Caterpillarwere brought by unionized employees
who alleged breaches of their individual employment contracts
which were made with their employer while they held non-union
managerial positions.' 1 0 These employees were downgraded to positions covered by the collective bargaining agreement and laid-off
pursuant to that agreement."' The employees brought suit in state
court and Caterpillar removed the action to federal court on the
basis that the claims arose under section 301.112 The Supreme
Court held that removal to federal court was improper. The Court
noted that the employees could have brought their complaint
under section 301, but chose not to do so." 3 Moreover, the Court
reasoned that the employees' complaint was not substantially dependent on the collective bargaining agreement nor did the complaint address the relationship between the individual contracts
tee was empowered to resolve disputes involving any insurance-related issues that may arise.
Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 215-16.
106. Id. at 216.
107. Id. at 220-21. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text (discussing Lucas
Flour § 301 preemption). See also supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text (discussing
Maddox exhaustion prerequisites).
108. 471 U.S. at 216.
109. 107 S. Ct. 2425 (1987).
110. Id. at 2427-28.
111. Id. at 2428.
112. Id. See Williams v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 786 F.2d 928 (9th Cir. 1986).
113. 107 S. Ct. at 2431.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 27:813

and the bargaining agreement. 14
In International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. Hechler,115 the Supreme Court addressed section 301 preemption as applied to an employee's state tort action against her union. In Hechler, an employee sued her union for an alleged breach of a duty of
care to ensure safe working conditions by assigning her work in
dangerous locations. The union removed the action to federal court
on the ground that any duty owed the plaintiff arose solely from
the collective bargaining agreement and was therefore a section
301 suit. 1 6 The union moved to dismiss the action as untimely
under the applicable federal statute of limitations.1 7 The Supreme
Court held that the employee's action was properly removed to
federal court and was preempted by section 301.118 The Court
noted that the state law imposed upon the employer a duty of care
owed to the employee, 11 9 and reasoned that to determine the
union's liability would necessitate an inquiry into whether the collective bargaining agreement placed upon the union an implied
duty of care. 2 ' The Court concluded that the source of these inquiries was "inextricably intertwined" with the collective bargaining agreement and required interpretation of the agreement; therefore, Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck mandated that the claim be
preempted.''
The thrust of Lueck, Metropolitan Life, Caterpillarand Hechler is that state causes of action, whether founded in tort or in
contract, should not be preempted if the claims are grounded in
rights which are independent of collective bargaining agreements
and do not substantially frustrate federal labor policy. Lingle is
the first case decided by the Supreme Court in which a state tort
114. Id. The Court explicitly rejected Caterpillar's argument that § 301 requires that
all employment matters involving unionized employees be governed by federal common law
created by § 301. Id. at 2432 n.10. The Court stated that claims with no relationship to a
collective bargaining agreement beyond the fact that they are asserted by an individual covered by such an agreement are not preempted by § 301. Id.
115. 107 S. Ct. 2161 (1987).
116. Id. at 2162.
117. Id. See supra note 74.
118. 107 S. Ct. at 2168.
119. Id. at 2167 (citing Putnam Lumber Co. v. Berry, 146 Fla. 595, 2 So. 2d 133
(1941)).
120. Id. at 2166.
121. Id. (quoting Allis-Chalmers v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213 (1985)). The Court offered no opinion as to whether the plaintiff's claim in Hechler would have survived preemption had the court found that the union owed a duty to the plaintiff independent of the
collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 2168-69 n.5.
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claim was sustained against a section 301 preemption challenge.
The Court deftly avoided preemption by establishing that the state
cause of action was in no way dependent on interpretation of the
collective bargaining agreement. The Lingle Court, however, chose
not to give deference to Maddox or to any of its previously stated
strong policy positions regarding the need to defer to arbitration
those matters of dispute arising under collective bargaining agreements. That is, the court failed to consider the effects of its decision on the federal labor scheme.
Although preliminary indications are that federal courts may
narrowly construe Lingle,12 2 employers of unionized employees now
face the possibility of defending their actions in two arenas: civil
litigation on a state-based tort claim and the arbitration forum.
This possibility affects the roles of both unions and employers in
the federal labor scheme. Employers may well be discouraged from
entering into collective bargaining agreements knowing that arbitration may not be the exclusive remedy for their actions. Unions
may also lose one of their key organizing points-protection from
unjust dismissal. A weighing of the states' interest in regulating the
conduct in question against the potential for interference with the
federal regulatory scheme would result in Lingle's cause of action
being preempted as colliding with the central role of arbitration in
the federal scheme of labor law.
Under such an analysis, one could argue that all causes of action
of a unionized employee against her employer should be preempted. This is not so, however. For example, federal causes of
action such as Title VII suits escape such an analysis by their nature. That is, Congress was presumably aware of federal labor policy in enacting such legislation, and hence, failure to provide exceptions for unionized employees indicates intent to co-exist in the
federal scheme. In addition, state law based wrongful discharge
claims could also survive, providing union employees with rights
independent from those provided in the labor agreement.
Deference should first be given to the arbitration process. In
other words, an employee should be permitted to sue in tort only if
she has exhausted her contractual remedies and is found to be un122. See Newberry v. Pacific Racing Assoc., 854 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1988) (union employee's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress preempted by § 301); Knafel v.
Pepsi Cola Bottlers of Akron, 850 F.2d 1155 (6th Cir. 1988) (union employee's claim that
conditions of her current employment calculated to bring her intentional harm preempted
by § 301); Laws v. Calmat, 852 F.2d 430 (9th Cir. 1988) (union employee's claim that employer's drug testing program violates California constitution preempted by § 301).
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justly dismissed. If an arbitrator finds that the employee's discharge was for just cause, the employee should not be permitted to
sue in tort absent some extraordinary circumstances such as
breach of duty of fair representation.
Despite the simplistic test implied by Lingle-that a state law
claim is not preempted when it is "independent" of a collective
bargaining agreement-it remains to be seen whether lower courts
will be able to consistently apply this test. As evidenced by this
note, case law prior to and after Lingle suggests otherwise. Until
some consistency is reached, employees and employers alike are
left without knowing the extent of available remedies for wrongful
discharge, and both are left in the dark as to the appropriate forum in which a dispute will be resolved.
Daniel Pagliari

